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Introduction
Many recent systems are built on top of distributed hash tables (DHTs) which provide a scalable and distributed service to map items into keys. The basic operation is Lookup(key) that is performed by routing queries through a series of nodes. Each of these nodes uses a local routing table to forward the query to the node which is responsible for the key. While DHTs have been designed to tolerate faults, they can not be guaranteed that the involved nodes can be trusted. For instance, in the Sybil Attack [1] , a malicious node associates itself illegitimately with a large number of identities by impersonating other nodes. It can behave as if it were a large number of nodes, called Sybil nodes, which communicate with legitimate nodes. These sybil nodes may drop, corrupt Lookup messages or act as the destination of a Lookup query.
In this paper, we focus on the issue of secure message routing in DHTs. The main idea is to (i) use identity-based encryption to generate signatures to guarantee the integrity and authenticity of messages (ii) develop ack-based tracer routing strategy to detect malicious nodes (iii) create a secure path to bypass malicious nodes. Our protocol is applicable to any DHTs. In this paper, we take Chord as an example to illustrate how the protocol works.
Related work
A categorization of basic attacks that DHTs should be aware of is presented in [2] . It suggests defenses in many cases and abstracts these defenses into a set of general principles. Unfortunately, they did not propose concrete protocols for doing so.
Previous works on secure message routing concentrated mainly on employing redundancy to increase the probability of a message being delivered successfully. The goal of message routing is to maximize the probability that at least one copy of the correct message reach target.
Wallach [4] presents a multiple redundant routing algorithms for Pastry. An enquirer sends a query to all of its neighbors in Pastry overlay. Then each neighbor forwards the query towards the target. If at least one copy of the query arrives, it is considered successfully delivered. However, it will inevitably cause congestion and burden systems, especially in a bandwidth intensive system. Let c be the bandwidth cost of sending a query from a node to one of its neighbors, l be the number of neighbors of each node and h be the average number of hops of each query. Without any message redundancy, the Xu Xiang, Jianguo Chen average bandwidth cost of each query is only c*h ∈O(h). But with message redundancy, the average bandwidth cost will increase to c* ( 
Cyclone [5] has a similar idea. It provides d disjoint paths between two nodes in DHTs. However, the routing success rate degrades greatly as n is a big value, where n denotes the number of nodes in the system.
Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes attacks in message routing. Node-ID based signature scheme and tracer routing are presented in section 3 and section 4 respectively. In section 5, we design our bypassing scheme. Section 6 contains experimental results. Conclusions are given in Section 7.
Attacks in message routing
Castro [3] and Wallach [4] summarized three categories of secure routing required in DHTs, such as Chord [8] , Pastry [9] and Tapstry [10] : 1) Secure assignment node identifiers.
2) Secure routing maintenance.
3) Secure message routing. Secure assignment node identifiers and secure routing maintenance can be achieved by minimizing the probability that nodes are controlled by attackers. However, an adversary can prevent correct message from being delivered throughout the overlay. When one or more nodes between enquirer and target are malicious, a message might be dropped, polluted or forwarded to the wrong place. The objective of this paper is to address the issue of secure message routing (line 3).
We assume the following attack model: the network contains n(1-f) honest nodes and n*f malicious nodes, where 0<f<1, where n is the number of nodes in the system. The malicious nodes that we consider do not obey routing protocol correctly. They seek to mislead honest nodes by providing them with false information. Malicious nodes may conspire together and attack the message routing in the following ways:
1) Pretend to be the target.
2) Alter the message in transit.
3) Disrupt the message routing, or take advantage of locality to control some routes.
Node-ID based signature scheme
Verifying identities of remote nodes is the key element in secure DHTs. Without it, a node can not be sure who it is "talking with". In this section, we describe our method of verifying identities of remote nodes. First, ID selector service is presented to guarantee assigning identities of nodes securely. Then we propose ID-based encryption scheme.
Random ID selector
In DHTs, a node-ID is generated by hashing the IP address of a node. Hashing a value as a mechanism to generate a node-ID can be controlled by malicious nodes, which is inherently insecure. An adversary might obtain any desired node-IDs by faking IP address. Therefore DHTs require a new method to generate node-IDs.
A centralized certificate authority (CA) is proposed [12] , which is involved the first time a node wishes to join the overlay. A node certificate asserts that the node is authorized and has a unique node-ID. However, nodes require large amount of space to store the certificates and it is difficult to deploy such security protocols in DHTs where churn is an essential feature [11] .
To address this issue, we propose an ID Selector (IS) service. The node-ID is a random number generated by IS, and is not tied to an IP address. By limiting the rate at which IDs are generated, the effectiveness of sybil attack can be reduced. Rate limiting mechanism can include a minimal charge or require a valid credit card number. It makes obtaining a very large number required to corrupt DHTs impossible.
ID-based encryption
Each node should generate a signature. It obtains the private key from Private Key Generator (PKG) service. Its public key is a string that is derived from its peer identity or node geometric coordinates [6] [7] [11] in DHTs. Suppose that node x receives a signed message from node y, it verifies the signature using node y's identity as its public key. Note that there is no need for node x to obtain y's public key. Since each forwarder can verify received messages without contacting the enquirer, PKG not only simplifies the key management process significantly but also enhances the efficiency of verifying signature.
IS and PKG may be hosted at the bootstrap service layer of DHTs. The private key is generated only once when the node first joins the DHT through the usual operation of contacting the bootstrap nodes. The private key of a node is valid as long as its public key is valid.
Additionally, this scheme offers the merit that all nodes have the ability to determine the real ID of the remote node. By verifying the signature of the target, the enquirer can confirm that the query result has been delivered to the target, rather than a compromised node along the routing path. Thus, the first kind of attack mentioned in section 2 can be detected.
In summary, a node-ID is selected by IS, while the ID of key of content object is produced by hashing the key. Our scheme can easily be implemented in DHTs, and guarantee that IDs of malicious nodes are uniformly distributed.
Tracer Routing
In this section, we propose a novel efficient routing strategy: tracer routing. Combining it with a node-ID based signature scheme, messages can be verified in each hop so that malicious nodes can be identified.
Current routing strategies
Current routing strategies of DHTs can generally be categorized into two types: recursive routing and iterative routing. We analyze the characteristics of them as follows. We take Chord system as an example.
With recursive routing, an enquirer issues a Lookup query. If an intermediate node, say x, is not the target, x will forward the query to the next hop, without making any acknowledgement to the enquirer. The process repeats until the query reaches the target. Finally, the target sends the query result directly back to the enquirer (Figure 1 ). Recursive routing enables queries to be routed as quickly as possible, but enquirers have no control over the routing process.
In iterative routing, the enquirer can know the whole routing process. In each step, the enquirer asks each intermediate node to return the IP address of the next hop, instead of forwarding the query directly. With the returned IP address, the enquirer sends the query to each node of the routing path by itself, repeating until the query reaches target.
To measure the performance of routing strategies, one metric is adopted: normal routing latency, which is the latency to complete one query if there are no attacks in the system. Let t be average latency of one hop and h be the average number of hops of each query.
The first column of the table 1 lists the normal routing latency. The recursive routing is efficient, but not secure. The fact that intermediate nodes may assist in obfuscating the intermediate node disrupts the message forwarding. For example, an adversary may do not forward queries that it receives, or may forward them to the wrong place. The enquirer has no knowledge about the real cause.
Iterative routing is not efficient, but it gains some benefits due to its manageable behaviors. Intermediate nodes reply with the IP address of the next hops to the enquirer, thus it can send the message to the next hop directly. This ability allows the enquirer to control Lookup progress. Xu Xiang, Jianguo Chen 
Tracer routing design
To achieve the best routing strategy performance, we present a novel routing strategy, called tracer routing (Figure 1 ). Tracer routing enables enquirers to trace the whole routing process. It can reduce normal routing latency from 2*h*t to (h+1)*t. The basic principle of the routing strategy is described as follows.
In each step, an intermediate node x not only forwards the query to the next hop, but also returns it's IP address to the enquirer. With the additional information, the enquirer has the knowledge about the whole routing process. Each intermediate node directly forwards the query to the next hop, thus the query can be routed quickly.
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Now we propose a novel and realistic protocol to address routing attack problem. It combines tracer routing with node-ID based signature scheme. Note that node-ID based signature scheme is not necessary. Any technique which can verify the node-ID of remote node can work with tracer routing.
In our protocol, each node i generates a pair of public/private keys < ( H(q) )> to enquirer s as an acknowledgement, otherwise it will discard the fake one.
The process is repeated until the query reaches target.
Detecting malicious nodes
Here we analyze possible ways of attack. We consider the following cases: 1) Pollute query. A malicious node may forward a polluted or forged query to the next hop. The next hop can decide if the query is created by enquirer s by using public  s K to verify the signature.
2) Drop query. The query may be dropped. Since no acknowledgement will be sent to enquirer s, it can easily detect this kind of attacks.
3) Send query to a wrong node. A node may forward a query to a wrong node. However, due to without knowledge about the private key of the valid next hop, say x, enquirer s will not receive any acceptable acknowledgement which includes <  x K ( H(q))>. As a result, enquirer s can determine that node m is a malicious node. Note that enquirer can easily know the valid node-ID of the next hop using routing algorithms. Recall that, in Chord system, each hop always reduces the distance half.
From the above analysis, we see that the signature can be verified in each step so that malicious nodes in a routing path can be identified.
Bypassing Malicious Nodes
In this section, we present our bypassing protocol of finding out honest nodes to substitute identified malicious nodes.
Creating secure paths
When enquirer s identifies a malicious node, a secure routing path should be created to circumvent it. The key idea consists of two phases: 1) Identifying malicious nodes using tracer routing.
2) Selecting an honest node from a set of l candidates.
n ,..., t denote the routing path from enquirer s to target t. As soon as node s determines that a node, say i n , is a malicious node, it asks 1  i n to find out an honest node which will substitute for i n . Node 1  i n does this using a search_honest_finger() operation.
Pseudocode for search_honest_finger()
n sends messages to all of nodes in its successor list.
2) These nodes send inquiries to a set of l nodes that immediately succeed i n in the ring.
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In step 1, the notation, successor list, is first presented in Chord. Recall that, to increase robustness, each Chord node maintains a successor list of size r=  (logn). In step 2, all nodes in successor list of 1  i n forward inquires to l nodes that immediately succeed i n in the ring, each of which only requires  (1) hops. To simplify the analysis, we first assume that each malicious node always forward messages to the wrong place. We will analyze more complicated cases in section 5.2.
Therefore, in step 3,
n can detect malicious nodes and find an honest node using our tracer routing protocol. For instance, if a reply from one of l nodes is not correct, 
From Lemma 1, We see that the ID Selector(IS) service mentioned in section 3 is necessary. If a node-ID is generated by hashing a value (IP address), malicious nodes would obtain any desired IDs.
They are not uniformly distributed over the ID space. According to Lemma 1, even if f= 2 1 , the average number of hops is 2. provided with high probability. In section 6, we report the simulation result.
Preventing camouflage attacks
The scenario becomes more complicated when malicious nodes strategically alter their behavior such as deciding to alternate between good and bad behavior at regular or arbitrary frequencies.
To address this issue, we build a reputation system in which
n evaluates a set of l nodes that are close to i n based on tests. More formally, 1  i n maintains an experience repository which is a set of triples of the form <node_ID, n_pos, n_neg>. Each set represents the record of tests with a given node of these l nodes, reporting the number of correct routings and uncorrect routings through it. Only the stable node with high value of n_pos and low value of n_neg is considered as an honest node.
Simulation Results
Simulation results about performance evaluation are presented in this section. We apply our scheme on a Chord system comprising 16 2 nodes. In all simulations, each node is malicious with some probability f, independently of the other nodes. Thus the system contains n(1-f) honest nodes and n*f malicious nodes. Fig. 2 shows the probability of correct routing varied with different values of f. We compare the probability of routing correctly of our protocol with Cyclone [5] and Chord. In order to compare fairly, we set d=l=9, which means that Cyclone uses 9 independent paths at once and our protocol goes through 9 neighbors of a malicious node to find out an honest node. It is clear that our scheme overcomes Cyclone. Our scheme guarantees that there exists at least one secure routing path from the enquirer to the target with high probability, while one malicious node lying on each path to make redundant paths useless in Cyclone.
Figure 2. Probability of routing successfully
The value of l limits the probability of finding an honest node which will substitute for a malicious node in the routing path. We investigate the correct routing upon different value of l and present the results in Fig. 3 . The results show that the number of correct routing does increase with the increase of the l, but the improvement tends to be very little when l>8. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we present our protocol which provides a secure routing for DHTs. A key feature of our protocol from previous methods is that an honest node is only selected when detecting a malicious node. Simulation results show the superiority of our protocol in comparison with previous protocols.
